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Charitable Tort Immunity
Under the First Amendment
I. INTRODUCnON
The doctrine of charitable tort immunity was conceived in England
in 1861. The case of Holliday v. Leonard' held that to apply funds
in trust to satisfy a tort claim would be to thwart the intent of the
donor. In 1871, Holliday was overruled 2 and since then charities in
England have been liable for their torts.3 Apparently unaware that
the Holliday case had been overruled, the courts of Massachusetts
4
and Maryland' cited it as authority and established the immunity
rule in America. From the beginning, the doctrine was not without
its dissenters. In 1879, for example, Rhode Island rejected immunity.
6
The last ninety years in this country have seen the liability of
charities move from complete liability to almost complete immunity
and back to almost complete liabilityZ The doctrine has fallen into
such disfavor that most modern commentators condemn it as an
antiquated remnant of times long past and confidently predict its
imminent demise.
8
The doctrine, simply stated, is that a charity is not liable for its
torts. It is an exception to the general rule that one is liable for
the wrongs he commits and for those of his servants and agents when
committed in the scope of their employment or agency.9 Since 1942
the courts and the legislatures have increasingly repudiated or
severely limited the immunity.10 One or more of the following
qualifications are applied in various combinations by many states:
(1) Charities are immune only as to injuries done to beneficiaries of
1. 11 C.B.(n.s.) 192, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
2. Foreman v. Mayor of Canterbury, 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
3. Gilbert v. Corp. of Trinity House, 17 Q.B. 795 (1886).
4. McDonald v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
5. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
6. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hosp., 12 R.I. 411 (1879). However, the legislature
reinstated the doctrine with respect to hospitals. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-1-22 (1956).
7. The first American case holding a charity immune was decided in 1876. McDonald
v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., supra note 4. "Prior to 1942 only two or three courts had
rejected the immunity of charities outright." PNossE, ToRTs § 127, at 1023 (3d
ed. 1964) [hereinafter cited as Prossim]. "Today, only six jurisdictions stubbornly
adhere to complete charitable tort immunity." Fisch, Charitable Liability for Tort,
10 VLL. L. Rxv. (1965); see Note, 36 U. DFr. L.J. 636, 643 (1959).
8. 1 PRossim, § 27, at 1023; 2 ScoTr, TrusTs § 402 (1960); 3 Lipson, Charitable Im-
munity; The Plague of Modem Tort Concepts, 7 CL.V.-MA. L. R v. 483 (1958);
Posey, Need for Uniformity in Doctrine of Charitable Immunity, 23 GA. B.J. 398 (1961);
Note, 28 Cm.-KENT. L. REv. 268 (1950); Note, 55 DicK. L. REv. 148 (1950); Note,
37 N.C.L. REv. 209 (1959); supra note 7.
9. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 812
(D.C. Cir. 1942).
10. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
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the charity. Thus, paying patients, strangers, and employees can
recover from the charity for negligence." (2) Charities are liable for
corporate negligence or administrative negligence such as the negli-
gent selection and retention of employees. 12 (3) Charities are liable if
the activity out of which the injury ocurred was a non-charitable
activity.' 3 (4) Charities are liable to the extent of non-trust property
they hold or to the extent of liability insurance.1
4
According to a recent survey 5 six states'6 are committed to a
doctrine of complete immunity. Twenty-two states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico hold a charity liable just as any other
individual or corporation. Nineteen other states apply one or more
of the exceptions mentioned above. In a few states the legislatures
have taken action. Louisiana and Arkansas' 8 statutes permit a direct
action against the liability insurer. A Maryland statute19 has been
interpreted to estop the insurer and the insured from raising immunity
as a defense to the extent of insurance coverage.20 In Rhode Island
the legislature has reinstated the immunity as to hospitals.2' After the
11. Nebraska: Miller v. Concordia Teachers College, 296 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1961);
Connecticut: Halliburton v. General Hosp. Soc'y, 133 Conn. 61, 48 A.2d 261 (1946);
Georgia: YMCA v. Batey, 107 Ga. App. 417, 130 S.E.2d 242 (1963); Indiana: Richard-
son v. St. Mary's Hosp., 191 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1963); Louisiana: Jurievich v. Hotel
Dieu, 11 So. 2d 262 (La. 1943); North Carolina: Williams v. Randolph Hosp., 237
N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1963); Ohio: Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164
N.E.2d 563 (1960), reversing 159 N.E.2d 911 (1959); Texas: Velan v. Lucey, 259
S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); Virginia: Hill v. Leigh Memorial Hosp. 204 Va.
501, 132 S.E.2d 411 (1963); West Virginia: Meade v. St. Francis Hosp., 137 W. Va.
834, 74 S.E.2d 405 (1953); Wyoming: Bishop Randall Hosp. v. Hartley, 24 Wyo.
408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916). For more complete discussion see Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29,
89-108; 10 VmL. L. REV. 71 (1964).
12. Connecticut, Indiana, Texas. See cases cited note 11 supra; Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d
29, 112-125.
13. Illinois: Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order, 309 Ill. App. 145, 33 N.E.2d 161
(1941); Massachusetts: Grueninger v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 343
Mass. 338, 178 N.E.2d 917 (1961); Missouri: Blatt v. Geo. H. Nettleton Home for
Aged Women, 365 Mo. 30, 275 S.W.2d 344 (1955); North Carolina; Turnage v.
New Bern Consistory, 215 N.C. 798, 3 S.E.2d 8 (1939); Ohio: Bell v. Salvation Army,
172 Ohio St. 326, 175 N.E.2d 738 (1961); South Carolina: Eisenhardt v. State
Agric. & Mech. Soc'y, 235 S.C. 305, 111 S.E. 2d 568 (1959); Tennessee: Gamble v.
Vanderbilt, 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S.W.510 (1918).
14. Colorado: Michard v. Myron Stratton Home, 144 Colo. 251, 355 P.2d 1078
(1960); Illinois: Tidwell v. Smith, 27 IUI. App. 2d 63, 169 N.E.2d 157 (1960);
Tennessee: Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 S.W.2d 401 (1943).
15. Fisch, supra note 7.
16. Since that survey Pennsylvania has abolished the immunity. 33 U.S.L. WEK
1147, 2495 (Pa. March 22, 1965).
17. LA. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 655 (1959). This is a general direct action statute
not limited to charitable immunity actions.
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3240 (1959).
19. Md. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 85 (1957).
20. Ibid.
21. R.I. GEN LAWs § 7-1-22 (1956).
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New Jersey courts repudiated the doctrine in 1958,22 the legislature
re-established the charity's immunity from suits by beneficiaries
except for hospitals whose liability was limited to 10,000 dollars.23
One state has repudiated the immunity concept except for religious
activities. 24
This article will not attempt an exhaustive survey of the law in
every state, but will discuss the absolute immunity rule and its
modifications as well as the theories which form the foundation for
the rule. In addition, the constitutionality of the rule and its
modifications under the fourteenth amendment will be considered.
When the courts of a state grant immunity to churches and to church
operated charities, an additional question arises under the first amend-
ment guarantee of freedom from governmental establishment of
religion. These questions will be discussed in relation to recent
decisions of the Supreme Court.
II. ABsoLuTE IMmuNIY
Five states at present follow a rule of absolute immunity: Arkan-
sas,25 Maine,26 Massachusetts,27 Missouri,28 and South Carolina,29
Those who argue for absolute immunity offer a number of broad
policy reasons for its adoption. They have further formulated three
distinct legal theories as its basis: the trust fund theory, the theory
that respondeat superior is inapplicable to charities, and the govern-
mental immunity theory.
A. Policies Surrounding the Absolute Immunity Rule
Who can question that charities benefit society? In some cases
charities take over responsibilities that the state otherwise would have
to fulfill. Private colleges and universities alleviate the state's burden
of educating its people. Charitable hospitals, the Red Cross, and
similar institutions relieve the state of the necessity of caring for the
sick. Churches, the Salvation Army, and other institutions which
feed the poor and hungry, care for orphans and the aged, and provide
for the indigent, fulfill certain functions which the state would other-
wise have to perform. The taxes saved by the state in not having
22. Benton v. YMCA, 27 N.J. 67, 141 A.2d 198 (1958); Callopy v. Newark Eye &
Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958); Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church,
27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).
23. N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:53A-7 (Supp. 1964).
24. Pederson v. Immanuel Luthern Church, 57 Wash. 2d 576, 358 P.2d 549 (1961);
Lyon v. Tamwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 202, 287 P.2d 128 (1955).
25. Helton v. Sisters of Mercy, 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961).
26. Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Adt. 898 (1910).
27. Simpson v. Truesdale Hosp., 338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958).
28. Schultz v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp., 352 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1961).
29. Vermillion v. Women's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).
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to perform these services and the fact that most charities are beneficial
to society in general, provide the basis for a public interest in the
continuance of their work. An expression of this policy is the aid
given charities in the form of tax exemptions by both state and federal
governments.
On the other hand, there are policy arguments for the repudiation
of the doctrine. Since individuals who act charitably are nevertheless
liable if they act negligently, why should not a charitable corporation
also be liable? The corporate form does not ordinarily shield negligent
activity from liability. As Justice Rutledge said:
Whether the Good Samaritan rides an ass, a Cadillac, or picks up hitchikers
in a Model T, he must ride with forethought and caution .... Charity suf-
fereth long and is kind, but in the common law it cannot be careless. When
it is, it ceases to be kindness and becomes actionable wrongdoing. 30
There is a policy as old as the common law that he who wrongfully
injures some innocent person should pay. The greater danger to
society is that the injured victim of the charity's negligence without
means of redress will find himself destitute and become a ward of
the state.
31
Modem charities are no longer the small, underfinanced, ramshackle
operations they once were. Rather, they are operated like big business
and should meet the obligations commensurate with this position.
Charitable hospitals, nationally organized churches, research founda-
tions, and universities are most often in a better position to absorb
the loss of their own carelessness than the individual who is unfortu-
nate enough to be injured.32 The increased availability of liability
insurance, a relatively modern development, means that charities
no longer risk the complete depletion of their funds. The only
increased burden of liability would be the cost of premiums to provide
reasonable coverage. With the use of liability insurance the risk of
loss from negligent injury would be spread among all of the benefici-
aries of the charity through either a very slight increase in the
rates, or a very slight decrease in the amount of funds available for
use in the charitable purpose. The policy of spreading the burdens
of a particular undertaking among all of those who would benefit
30. President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 9, at 813.
31. "It is more consonant with public policy that charitable institutions, who deal
intimately with the health and lives of members of the public, be held to a reasonable
standard of care in conducting their operations. It is public policy to encourge greater
responsibility in order to discourage conduct harmful to life and limb." DETROIT BAR
AssocrAinoN, COMm. REPORT, cited in Note, 36 U. DET. L.J. at 648.
32. See Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 758, 267 P.2d 934, 939
(1954). See also Michaie v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hosp., 404 Pa. 424,
172 A.2d 769 (1961).
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from the undertaking is not a radical idea.33 This, in fact, has been
the modem trend exemplified by social legislation and judicial deci-
sions. Examples of this trend are many: compulsory automobile
liability insurance, social security, medicare, workmens compensation,
and absolute liability for defects in products.
Thus viewed, the doctrine of immunity is an outmoded anachronism
of days long past which has no validity in the modern world. As
Dean Prosser said of the immunity in his treatise on torts:
In short, the immunity of charities is clearly in full retreat; and it may be
predicted with some confidence that the end of the next two decades will
see its virtual disappearance from American law.4
It is submitted that this disappearance is an end result much to be
desired and that its demise will be mourned by few.
B. Theories Used by the Courts To Implement Absolute Immunity
1. The Trust Fund Theory.-The trust fund theory was first adopted
by the courts to establish immunity in America and is still the basis
for the holdings of numerous courts.35 This theory is based on the
idea that the assets of charities are held in trust and these assets can-
not be diverted to any purpose not authorized by the donor. Modern
scholars have universally condemned the "trust fund" theory as illogi-
cal, unwise and invalid. Dean Prosser says:
Its [the trust fund theory's] weakness lies in the fact that it is contrary to
the various decisions which have evolved methods of making other trust
funds responsible for torts committed in administering the trust, and that
since such funds would not be exempt in the hands of the donor himself,
he can scarcely have the power, even if it were true that he had even the
intention to confer such immunity upon the object of his bounty.36
Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts says:
Such a sweeping exemption [the trust fund theory] from liability of
charitable institutions seems to be clearly against public policy. The
institution should be just before it is generous.
3 7
Three courts which employ the trust rationale decline to extend the
immunity to non-trust property that the charity owns.3 Thus, a
charity is liable if it carries liability insurance or has some other non-
33. "What is at stake, so far as the charity is concerned is the cost of reasonable
protection, the amount of the insurance premium as an added burden on its finances,
not the awarding over in damages of its entire assets." President & Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 9 at 824.
34. PossFR~ § 127, at 1024.
35. See notes 3-5 supra; ScoT, TRusTs § 402 (Abr. ed. 1960).
36. PRossEm § 127, at 1020.
37. ScoTT, op. cit. supra note 35, at 7320.
38. See note 14 supra.
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trust property, but immune if it refuses to hold such property.
Colorador requires that the existence of non-trust property be proved
as a prerequisite to the maintenance of the action.39 The other two
courts in this group hold that immunity is directed only to trust
property and not to the charity.40 As a result, a judgment can be
obtained from a charity, but execution on that judgment can levy
only against non-trust property.
2. Inapplicability of Respondeat Superior.-Another theory used to
support absolute immunity is the refusal to apply vicarious liability to
a charity.41 The reason given is that the master gets no pecuniary
benefit from the work of the servant and, therefore, he should not be
held responsible for the negligent act of the servant.42 This theory is
based on a misunderstanding of the reason for vicarious liability.
The real policy behind respondeat superior is that the master should
be liable because of the control he exercises over the servant.43 In
applying this theory some courts have held the charity liable where,
in addition to the negligence of a servant, there is also negligence
chargeable directly to the charity; such as the negligent selection or
retention of employees."
3. Governmental Immunity.-Many courts have cloaked the charity
with sovereign immunity because of the quasi-public character of
many charities and the similarity of charitable functions to govern-
mental functions.45 It is true that many charities provide services that
would otherwise be provided by the state. This reasoning is similar
to that used to justify property tax exemption of charities. Tax-
exemption, however, is paid for by the public as a whole rather than
by isolated individuals. If the public benefits from charities, the
39. Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929).
40. See Tidwell v. Smith, supra note 14; Anderson v. Armstrong, supra note 14.
41. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
42. Fordyce v. Woman's Christian Nat'l Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S.W. 155
(1906); Hearns v. Waterbury Hosp., 66 Conn. 98, 33 AUt. 595 (1895); Blackman v.
YWCA, 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 781 (1922); Nicholas v. Evangelica 1 Deaconess
Home, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643 (1920).
43. Other justifications, however, have been given for the doctrine. The psycho-
logical identity of master and servant; the master's superior ability to respond in
damages; the desire to encourage employers to avoid and prevent tortious invasions
through safety programs, etc., and the possibility for passing the costs to the general
public under a "cost of doing business theory," are but a few. Hacklett, Why Is A
Master Liable For the Tort of His Servant? 7 HAzv. L. Rrv. 107 (1893);
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Morris, Enter-
prise Liability and The Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE
L.J. 554 (1961). See also Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 145 Fla. 360, 199 So.
344 (1940); Gable v. Salvation Army, 186 Okla. 687, 100 P.2d 244 (1940);
(Lichty v. Carbon County Agric. Ass'n, 31 F. Supp. 809, 811 (M.D. Pa. 1940).
44. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 112-30 (1952). For a good discussion of the
problems the courts have encountered in trying to distinguish corporate from individual
negligence, see 36 U.DEr. L.J. at 639.
45. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 67 (1952).
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public should pay the bill rather than individuals. Also, it might be
noted that the citadel of governmental tort immunity is under assault.
C. Constitutionality of Absolute Immunity
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment grants every
individual the right to be free in his person and property from tortious
invasion.46 When such an invasion occurs the courts should be open
to all persons regardless of their status to seek redress for these
wrongs. To close the courts to an innocent claimant merely because
of the charitable character of the defendant is to deprive the claimant
of the right to be free from tortious invasion.47 When the remedy
enforcing a right is taken away, the right itself is also taken. Sub-
stantive due process also requires that the law itself must be fair,
reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious and free from unreasonable
discrimination. 48 It could be argued that substantive due process
prohibits the state from establishing charitable immunity. In effect,
the doctrine of immunity takes the property of a claimant, i.e., the
damages to which he would ordinarily be entitled, and forces the
claimant to contribute it to charity. It could not be said to be a
fine or a penalty because the claimant has done no wrong. On the
contrary, the claimant is picked out to make this charitable con-
tribution not of his own volition, but, by the fortuitous circumstance
of injury. Assuming that the entire public is benefitted by charitable
institutions, should not the public foot the bill rather than placing
the burden on the few individuals who are injured.49 Despite the
appeal of this reasoning, it seems to have been adopted by only one
court. Florida's equivalent of the "due process clause' is a "due
course of law" clause59 as follows:
All courts in this state shall be open, so that every person for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by
46. FoRKoscH, CONSTnT-unONAL LAW § 385 (1963).
47. "Law may be said to deprive him of such rights, even if state law never
purported to admit that he had them. A common-law rule would seem to be as
effective a deprivation as a statute, even if it does not depart from the law as laid
down in previous decisions of the state court." HALF, FREEDOM Timouosr LAw 247
(1952).
48. "And the guarantee of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected
shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Nebbia
v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934).
49. "No conception of justice demands that an exception to the rule of respondeat
superior be made in favor of a charity and against the person of a beneficiary... '."
Sheehan v. North County Community Hosp., 273 N.Y. 163-64, 7 N.E.2d 28-29
(1937).




due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale,
denial or delay.5'
The Florida Supreme Court in Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hos-
pital,52 held that the doctrine of respondeat superior was so much a
part of "due course of law" as to require its use when applied to
charities.- On the other hand, the doctrine of respondeat superior
is itself an exception to the rule that a person is liable only for his
own wrongful acts.5 Vicarious liability merely gives the plaintiff
an additional person from whom he may recover. It is more in the
nature of a privilege than a right.m If a claimant has his cause of
action against the principal tortfeaser, this should be enough to
satisfy due process. The Constitution does not profess to provide a
solvent defendent for every claimant.56 The question, in short, is
whether a state can constitutionally free a charity from vicarious
liability that is forced on all other enterprises.
It may be helpful, in our inquiry, to compare the charitable im-
munity theory with the concept of workmen's compensation. These
remedial statutes took away the workman's common-law action for
negligence and replaced it with a statutory action with limited re-
covery. The Supreme Court held that these laws did not violate
due process as to the workman because a reasonable substitute was
given for the right taken.57 Limited recovery was enforced on the
workman, but in exchange he was freed from the common-law
defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the
fellow servant rule.58 In addition, the strong public need for such
51. FLA. CONST., Declaration of Rights § 4.
52. Supra note 43.
53. Ibid.
54. "Common-sense is opposed to making one man pay for another man's vrong
unless he has actually brought the wrong to pass according to the ordinary canons of
legal responsibility." Holmes, Agency, 5 HAv. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891). See also
Fleming, Vicariow Liability, 28 TuL. L. REv. 161 (1954).
55. A number of outstanding scholars have had difficulty justifying respondeat
superior as anything but a fiction used to accommodate public policy. See, e.g., BA-rY,
Vicimous Lr ,Bxxr (1916). PnossEa § 68; MECHEN, AGENCY §§ 350-53 (4th ed.
1952); Holmes, supra note 54; Fleming, supra note 53. "Thus the proposition that as
between two equally innocent persons, he who initiated the enterprise must bear the
loss, while often stated, would virtually eliminate negligence as a basis of tort
liability." MEicmEM, supra §353.
56. An analogy could be made to procedural due process. It is conceded that
procedural due process only requires a state to give a claimant one day in court. A
second chance on appeal is not required to satisfy due process. Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956); McKane v. Darston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894). The same reasoning
could be used to say that substantive due process only requires that a claimant have
an action against the wrongdoer and does not require that he be given a second chance
against the wrongdoer's employer. On the other hand, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963), requires that if an appeal is granted to all, it cannot be withheld in a
discriminatory fashion or it will run afoul of the equal protection clause.
57. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
58. Ibid.
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legislation was cited as a reason for holding the laws constitutional.59
These elements are not present for the injured victim of a charity's
negligence. There is no substitute remedy given to replace the right
of action against the charity, nor is there such a strong need for the
immunity, as has been pointed out previously.
Equal protection of the laws means that all differences of treatment
by the law must be based on a reasonable classification. As previously
stated, individuals acting charitably are not immune from liability
if they are careless in their actions. But when charity takes on the
corporate form it is immune from responsibility for its negligent acts.
By granting immunity to corporate charities and not to individuals
acting charitably, the state is discriminating against individuals. Is
this discrimination reasonable? If charity is in the public interest and
it should be protected, it should not matter whether the one acting
charitably is an individual or a corporation. It seems unreasonable to
deny immunity for a careless charitable act merely because the actor
is not a corporation.60
Assuming that it is a proper state function to subsidize charities,
the question still remains whether the state can force certain indi-
viduals to subsidize the charities when the only basis of classifica-
tion for this group of individuals is that they must have been injured
by the charity. The discrimination becomes clearer when an analogy
is made to taxation. The immunity has the same economic effect as
if the state levied a tax to subsidize charities. If such a tax were
levied, the taxing event would be determined by the degree of care
exercised toward the taxpayer by someone else. The rate and base
of the tax would not be founded on the amount of benefit received,
as in ad valorem property taxes; nor on the ability of the taxpayer
to pay, as in income taxes; nor on some voluntary act of the taxpayer,
as in the sales tax, gift tax, or excise tax; nor on some event that
is certain to happen to all men, as in estate and inheritance tax.
To the contrary, it would be based on the extent of the injury received
from the charity and its servants. It is paid not in money, but in
pain and suffering, medical bills, loss of earnings and disabilities that
ordinarily the tortfeasor or his master would be required to pay.
Clearly, such a tax would be so arbitrary and discriminatory as to
violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
59. ibid.
60. "It is a strange distinction, between a charitable institution and a charitable
individual, relieving the one, holding the other for like service and like lapse in like
circumstances." President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, supra note 9
at 813. Further, doctors and lawyers who do much charitable work are liable for
their negligence. Doctors cannot incorporate and thus avoid liability, but hospitals
which perform a similar service are immune.
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Should not the state be prohibited from doing indirectly what it
obviously could not do directly?
III. BENEFCIARY WAivER RULE
Refusing to adopt absolute tort immunity, several courts have
followed a partial immunity approach in the beneficiary waiver or
assumption of risk rule.6' According to this rule, one who accepts
the benefits of a charitable institution impliedly assents to hold it
exempt from liability on claims based upon the negligence of its
servants.
At one time the justification for this theory was valid but its validity
has become less clear in light of modem developments. Justice
Musmanno, dissenting in Michael v. Hahnemann Medical College
& Hospital,62 emphasized the fallacy of this rule by comparing the
ancient charities with modem ones.
It is historically true, and it is a tribute to the soundness of the human
heart that it is true, that there was a time when good men and women,
liberal in purse and generous in soul, set up houses to heal the poor and
homeless victims of disease and injury. They made no charge for this
care....
Hospitals then were little better than hovels in which the indigent were
gathered for the primitive cures available. The wealthy and the well-to-do
were cared for in their homes... And if it happened that some poor mortal
was scalded by a sister of mercy, who exhausted from long hours of vigil
and toil, accidentally spilled a ladle of hot soup on a hand extended for
nourishment, there was no thought of lawsuits against the philanthropists
who made the meagre refuge possible. . . .A successful lawsuit against
such a feeble structure might well have demolished it and have thus
paralyzed the only helping hand in a world of unconcern for rag-clothed
sick and the crutchless disabled.63
Justice Musmanno goes on to point out that modern charities are in
a different situation. They are in fact quite wealthy and operated on
a businesslike basis. "And if the hospital is a business for the purpose
of collecting money, it must be a business for the purpose of meeting
its obligations." 64 The extreme wealth of charities and the ready
availability of liability insurance have obviated the need for the
beneficiary rule.
There is seldom any contention that the rule is anything but a
fiction.65 Generally, when one goes to a hospital, for instance, he
expects to receive the best care available. There is certainly no
61. See cases cited note 11 supra.
62. 404 Pa. 424, 172 A.2d 769 (1961).
63. Id. at 457, 172 A.2d at 786.
64. Ibid.
65. PRossEa § 127. "The theory of implied waiver... is so thoroughly illogical that
it is difficult to understand how it has gained the approval of any court. It not only
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real voluntary and intentional relinquishment of a right of action,
which is the basis of a waiver. The theory is also criticized because
of the difficulty of determining who is a beneficiary.66 Servants, 67
paying patients,68 private nurses, 69 persons accompaning a patient,7 0
members of church 71 have all been held to be strangers to the charity
and thus, allowed to recover.7 2 On the other hand, church members
have been held to be beneficiaries.7
3
IV. CoNsTrtrioNAL VALIDITY OF CHAITrrABLE IMMuNITY
WHEN APPLIED TO CHURmCms
In recent years, the Supreme Court has made some sweeping
decisions interpreting the first amendment's guarantees of freedom
from establishment of religion and the right to the free exercise of
religion. 4 "Although these two clauses may in certain instances over-
lap, they forbid two quite different kinds of governmental incroach-
ment on religion." 75 The establishment clause prohibits governmental
support or sanction of religion, while the free exercise clause pro-
hibits any governmental obstacle placed in the path of religion. When
government through the legislature or the courts grants an immunity
from tort liabliity to religious institutions, this is an obvious financial
aid to religion. The question is whether this indirect subsidy consti-
tutes an establishment of religion prohibited by the first amendment.
A similar question is presented with reference to tax advantages given
religious institutions. Legal scholars have disagreed both as to the
principles employed by the Court and as to those which should be
denies the very individuals for whom the charity was intended the benefit of the charity,
but it makes it compulsory upon him, if injured by the negligence of an employee,
to donate to charity the amount he would otherwise be entitled to recover." Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center, 12 Ariz. 22, 31, 230 P.2d 220, 226 (1951).
66. 130 F.2d 810, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
67. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 89 (1952).
68. Id. at 106.
69. Id. at 109.
70. Ibid.
71. Id. at 108.
72. Id. at 110. Contra, Makar v. St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church, 78
N.J. Super. 1, 187 A.2d 353 (1963).
73. Makar v. St. Nicholas Rutherian Creek Catholic Church, supra note 72.
74. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requirement that in order to receive
unemployment benefits one must be willing to work on Saturday violated free exercise
as to one whose religion forbade working on Saturday); Abington School Dist. v.
Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Lord's Prayer case); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1062) (Regent's Prayer case); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (released
time program off school premises); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948)
(released time on school premises); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(school transportation for students of parochial schools).
75. Engel v. Vitale, supra note 74, at 430 (Black, J.).
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employed to determine the limits of governmental connection with
religion.
7 6
Commentators have proposed at least four different views as to
the present meaning of the first amendment in light of recent cases:
(1) no-aid or absolute separation view,77 (2) neutrality or primary
purpose view,71 (3) aid or cooperation view, 79 and (4) accomoda-
tion or no hostility view.80
A. No Aid or Absolute Separation
The foundation for this theory is found in the famous dictum of
Mr. Justice Black in Everson v. Board of Education.81 This case
held that the use of public funds to transport parochial school chil-
dren to school did not violate the establishment clause. Justice Black
stated in dictum a rule that was so broad and comprehensive that it
was not even followed in the instant case.
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the first amendment means at
least this: neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church,
neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or
disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining
or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance, or non-
church attendance. No tax in any amount, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither the state nor
the federal government can openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended
to erect a wall of separation between church and state.
82
It should be pointed out that the case in which this statement
appears did not follow it, but validated an obvious aid to religion.
76. KAuPER, RELIGION & ri CONsTrunoN (1064); KATZ, RELIGION & AMEmcAN
CONSTITUTIONS (1964); KULrmAND, RELIGION & THm LA-W (1961); Lin-EL, Church, State,
and University, in RELIGION & THE PUBLIC ORDER (1964).
77. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74 at 229-30 (Douglas, J., con-
curring); PFFxFE, CHuucH, STATE & FREEDom (1053); SToKEs & PrEPPEr, Caruncil
& STATE IN THE UNITED STATES (1964).
78. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74, at 217-22 (Clark, J.) KUHLANn,
op. cit. supra note 76; KAz, op. cit. supra note 76.
79. DiiNAN, RELIGION, THE CoURTs & PUBLIc PoucY (1963); RicE, SUPREME COUT
& PUuc PRAYER (1964); Drinan, The Constitutionality of Public Aid to Parochial
Schools, in THE WALL BETwEEN CummcH & STATE 55 (1963); Gorman, A Catholic
View, in THE WALL BrwEEN CHURCH & STATE 41 (1963).
80. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74, 230-34 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). KAUPER, Cw. LiBRTmS & THE CONSTITTrnON (1962); KAUPER, RELIGION
& THE CONSTITUTION (1964).
81. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. Id. at 15-16. (Emphasis added.)
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Its statement that "no tax in any amount, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions," has been rejected by Congress
in the recent Aid to Education Act.83 Mr. Justice Black, however, gives
an excellent statement of the no-aid rule which has been quoted in
several subsequent cases.84
The no-aid theory reflects the fear of many that allowing one
religion or all religions to gain control of the public purse would result
in depriving others of their religious freedom. It would also lead dif-
ferent sects to compete with each other for the aid of the government
and bring religious controversies out of the churches and into the
public arena.Y5 Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting, in Everson said that
the first amendment
was intended not only to keep the state's hands out of religion, but to keep
religion's hands off the state, and above all, to keep bitter controversy out
of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting
control of public policy or the public purse.86
The McCollum8 7 and Torcasom cases could be said to support the
absolute separation doctrine. McCollum held that public schools can-
not provide a released time program of religious instruction on the
school premises. The Torcaso case held that a state requirement
that a notary public make an oath to his belief in God before receiving
his commission was invalid. McCollum must be considered in light
of Zorach,89 which upheld a released time program conducted away
from the school premises. The Court has validated Sunday closing
laws,90 an obvious aid to the christian religion and a hindrance to a
Sabbatarian. In the Jensen 1 case, the court held that an exception
to the general law of jury duty must be made for someone whose re-
ligion forbids him to serve on a jury. In Sherbert,2 the Court
required that an exception be made to an unemployment benefit law
for one whose religion forbade working on Saturday.
In light of these cases, it is apparent that the Court has found it
impossible to erect a wall of complete separation. Absolute separa-
tion would invalidate such things as: chaplains in the armed forces,
chaplains in prisons, religious inscriptions on coinage, currency and
83. 77 Stat. 368 (1963), 20 U.S.C. § 716 (1964).
84. Engel v. Vitale, supra note 74, Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 74.
85. KAz, op. cit. supra note 76, at 25-26.
86. Everson v. Board of Educ., supra note 74, at 26-27.
87. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (148).
88. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
89. Zorach v. Clauson, supra note 74.
90. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
91. In re Jensen, 375 U.S. 14, remanded 267 Minn. 136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
92. Sherbert v. Verner, supra note 74.
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public buildings, prayers opening judicial and legislative sessions,
tax exemption of church property, deductions for religious contribu-
tions, tax benefits for clergymens' living quarters and many other
things which are well established. Carried even further, an abso-
lute wall of separation would require that churches be denied fire
and police protection, sewage, and other governmental service.
Churches could not pay property taxes.93 Obviously, only the most
vehement and unreasonable separationist can advocate complete
separation. Religion is a basic part of the lives of many Americans,
a part of our heritage. It cannot be ignored by the government. The
logical end of the "no-aid" doctrine is a government that is hostile to
religion. If the government is hostile to religion the "free exercise"
of religion will be inhibited, and such inhibition would be equally
invalid.94
If the Court were to apply the strict separation theory, the charita-
ble immunity would certainly fail. It is not doubted that freedom from
tort liability is a great aid to religion. The immunity could even be
considered an aid to one religion over another. It would aid the
organized religion over the individual religion. The individual who is
opposed to organized religion, but is a religion unto himself would be
liable whereas the organized religion would be free from liability. The
immunity could be considered an indirect tax levied for the support
of religion and therefore invalid.95 The language of Mr. Justice Black
quoted above would point to that result. However, the dicta of Mr.
Justice Black was not followed even in Everson and although it
was quoted in McCollum, Torcaso, and Schemp, it was conspicuous
in its absence in Zorach and Engel. Congress has rejected this view
in enacting the Aid to Education Act which provides government
funds for parochial schools. 6
B. Neutrality or Primary Purpose
In the Schemp case the Court struck down regulations requiring
recitation of the Lord's prayer in the public schoolsY Choosing not
to use the precedent of the Engel case the Court, through Mr. Justice
Clark, theorized that government should deal with religion in an
attitude of "wholesome neutrality." That is, government must neither
be favorable nor hostile to religion. This test does not preclude some
incidental aid to religion as did the strict separation theory. Mr.
Justice Clark's test is stated as follows:
93. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74, at 260 (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
94. Id. at 299.
95. The tax analogy is more fully developed in the text accompanying note 60 supra.
96. Supra note 83.
97. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74.
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What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either
is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds
the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the establishment clause there
must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion.9 8
Examples can be seen in federal loans to church operated schools,99
federal funds given to church operated hospitals under the Hill-
Burton Act,100 and aid to private church operated colleges and uni-
versities.' 0 ' In Schemp the Court said that the use of religious
means (the Lord's prayer) to achieve the secular end of good citizen-
ship had as its primary effect the advancement of religion. Professor
Kurland, also, comes to the conclusion that neutrality should be the
test.10 2 Kurland's test is:
The freedom and separation clauses should be read as stating a single
precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action
or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be, prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden.1
03
In testing the immunity of charities against the neutrality theory,
it is necessary to divide religious activities into two basic catagories:
(1) Charitable activities operated by a church. These activities are
functions that it would be appropriate for the state to serve, such as
hospitals, schools, and orphans homes. These could be called the
social or welfare enterprises of churches. (2) Churches themselves
and strictly religious activities such as worship, sacrament, indoctrina-
tion, and ordination. These functions are always inappropriate for
the government except when it is necessary to protect the free
exercise of religion. For example, chaplains in the armed services are
necessary in order to protect the servicemen's freedom to worship.
The first category includes activities in which the whole public has
an interest and in which the state actively participates. To do away
with the immunity as to church operated charities and not as to
other private charities would be a "classification in terms of religion"
which "imposes a burden" on religion.' 4 Thus, we see an example
where free exercise can limit the scope of the establishment clause.
Immunity when applied to church operated charities would probably
be upheld under the neutrality theory. To use the words of Mr.
98. Id. at 222.
99. National Educational Defense Program, 20 U.S.C. §§ 401 (1964).
100. 78 Stat. 447, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1964).
101. Supra note 83.





Justice Clark, 05 the primary purpose of the immunity is to encourage
and benefit all charities. Because of the public secular interest in
education and care for the sick, the courts can benefit charities. The
primary effect is not to aid religion but to enable all charities to carry
on their public functions at a lower cost. One commentator has
said that "the establishment clause precludes aid to religion as such
but not aid extended to religious activities incidental to a broader
classification which rests on a legitimate secular basis."'
The issue is not nearly so clear when applied to churches and
purely religious functions. The first question raised is whether a
church in its purely religious functions is a charity. If one defines
a charity as a non-profit organization, then a church would qualify.
However, if the definition further requires that it must perform a
function which relieves the state of its duties, then a church would
not qualify.
It might be argued that churches serve a secular function in
developing moral character and responsibility in the citizemy and,
therefore, the purpose of the immunity is to advance this secular
purpose.10 7 This same reasoning could be used to justify a state
church or the granting of direct subsidies to churches. These purely
religious functions, if performed by the state directly, would certainly
be invalid. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the primary effect
of the immunity is to aid the church in carrying on strictly church
functions; and, therefore, is invalid under the second part of Justice
Clark's test.
C. Aid or Cooperation View
This view completes the swing of the pendulum from no-aid to
neutrality to active aid and support of religious institutions. This is
commonly called the Catholic view. Its advocates contend that
neutrality of government is invalid because "absolutely-no-help hurts
and, therefore violates the principle of absolutely-no-harm."'' 8 To
state the argument affirmatively, government, rather than ignoring
religion, can recognize that churches "perform a useful and desirable
function, even a public purpose, and that within the limits imposed
by the Constitution their activities may be encouraged and favored
by the state." 0 9 Some would construe the first amendment to mean
105. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74.
106. KAuPER, op. cit. supra note 76, at 65.
107. For a discussion of these same principles when applied to tax exemption, see
Kauper, Tax Exemption for Religious Activities, in THE WALL BEwEEN CmmcH &
STATE 112-13 (Oaks ed. 1963).
108. Gorman, supra note 79, at 45.
109. KAuPER, op. cit. supra note 80, at 114.
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that government can and should aid theistic religion as opposed to
non-theistic religion, but should not discriminate between the various
theistic religions. 110 Others view the establishment clause only as a
prohibition against an established church and nothing more."' While
this view is held by a number of scholars, the Supreme Court hs
never adopted it and is not likely to do so.
D. Accomodation or Prevention of Hostility
A middle-of-the-road view has been advocated which, while pre-
venting deep involvement by the government, would still accomodate
the institutions of government to religion to prevent hostility. This
theory, proposed by Mr. Justice Brennan in his concurring opinion in
Schemp and by Professor Kauper, recognizes that Americans are a
religious people and that because of that heritage, religion is an in-
tegral part of their lives. Recognizing that a conflict exists between
the establishment clause and the free exercise clause, these men
propose that government "cannot be indifferent to religion in American
life, and that far from being hostile or even neutral, it may accom-
modate its institutions and its programs to the religious interest of
the people."12
Mr. Justice Brennan was quick to point out that the Schemp de-
cision did not invalidate tax exemptions which, "incidentally benefit
churches and religious institutions, along with many secular charities
and non-profit organizations. . . . For religious institutions simply
share benefits which government makes generally available to educa-
tional, charitable and eleemosynery groups."113 The limits, as laid
down by Justice Brennan, seem to be: The Constitution enjoins those
involvements of religious with secular institutions which: "(a) serve
the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ
the organs of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c)
use essentially religious means to serve governmental ends where
secular means would suffice." 114 Mr. Justice Brennan believes that the
wall of separation should be drawn where the dangers feared by
the founders are present in modem activties and not where the
founders previously would have drawn the line.115 The above language
would grant charitable immunity to "welfare enterprises" of religious
groups. If the state is going to grant immunity to charities generally,
it must give the immunity to religious charities that are engaged in
the same activities in order to prevent hostility to religion. On the
110. R E, op. cit. supra note 79.
111. MORRELL, THE FisT A E DmENr (1964).
112. KAuPER, op. cit., supra note 76, at 69.
113. Abington School Dist. v. Schemp, supra note 74, at 301.




other hand, purely religious functions would apparently be excluded.
Immunity in tort, if applied to purely religious activities, would be
using the instruments of the state to further religion.
Tax exemption most nearly parallels the problem of tort immunity.
The question of tax exemption for religious institutions has not been
passed on by the court." 6 Professor Kauper concludes that tax exemp-
tion under neutrality or accomodation would be upheld as to "wel-
fare enterprises" that a church operates if the enterprise would be
appropriate for the government or a non-religious charity to operate.
On the other hand, he recognizes that tax exemption for a house
of worship and other completely religious enterprises constitutes a
direct aid to religion." 7 A case arising in Alabama has held that a
tax on religious garb used solely for religious purposes is invalid
because it is a tax on religion in violation of the free exercise clause. 1 8
This principle could be distinguished from taxation of church build-
ings because they serve other functions such as social gatherings',
boy scout meetings, recreational activities, civic activities. Another
problem is presented if the state taxes church property used for
other purposes and exempts other eleemosynary activities. This would
constitute hostility toward religion which under the accomodation
theory would be invalid. Kauper predicts that the court will uphold
the tax exemption even though it is a direct aid to religion because
of its universal application and the long established history of tax
exemption." 9
If one assumes that the same public interest is served by granting
immunity from liability in tort to church operated charities as is
served by the tax exemption, it is easy to conclude that the immunity
is serving a secular purpose with only incidental benefits accruing
to religion. Kauper's reasoning could just as easily apply to immunity
as to exemption.
[G]overnment, in recognition of the place in our pluralistic system of private,
voluntary and non-profit enterprises that serve purposes consistent with the
public interest may appropriately relieve them of obligations otherwise
imposed by law in order to further their freedom to operate.
120
There are, however, three basic distinctions between tax exemption
and the tort immunity. First, charitable tort immunity does not have
116. "[N]othing actually held by the Supreme Court to date compels the conclusion
that tax exemptions for religious purposes are unconstitutional." Kauper, supra note
107, at 115.
117. Id. at 113-14.
118. Toolen v. State, In Equity, No. 58-983, Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala., July
29, 1963, discussed in RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 267 (1964).
119. Kauper, supra note 107, at 113, 114.
120. Id. at 114.
121. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
122. Ibid.
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the long and consistent history that gives the tax exemption a pre-
ferred position. Tort immunity was not introduced into this country
until 1876.121 Second, charitable tort immunity was never universal
in this country. From the beginning, some courts rejected it as being
opposed to public policy.122 Third, the state is forcing, not the public
as in tax exemption, but an individual to contribute to a church to
which he might be strongly opposed.
V. CONCLUSION
The absolute separation doctrine and the cooperation doctrine can
be virtually excluded as theories which the Court might adopt. Under
both the accomodation and neutrality theories, immunity of church
supported welfare and social institutions would probably be upheld
where immunity was granted other charities. The immunity of the
churches themselves is on somewhat shakier ground. Under the neu-
trality test, there is no real secular purpose served in granting the
immunity. The primary effect is to aid religion. Under the accomoda-
tion test there is no conflict with free exercise to require churches to
be responsible for their own negligence. Tort immunity is not merely
accomodating government institutions to the religious interest of the
people. It is forcing individuals to subsidize a purely religious institu-
tion.
Only one case has been presented with first amendment objections
to the tort immunity.123 That case rejected the arguments summarily.
Despite the strong arguments against the constitutionality of tort
immunity when applied to churches, it is predicted that neither the
state courts nor the Supreme Court will strike down something
in which so many people have a special interest. Because of the
close connection that the immunity has with tax exemption and the
long history of tax exemption the courts will probably hold them
both constitutional.
I. STEPUEN NORTH
123. Makar v. St. Nicholas Ruthenian Greek Catholic Church, supra note 72.
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